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Abstract
It is often helpful to distinguish between a theory (Marr’s computational level) and a specific 
implementation of that theory (Marr’s physical level). However, in the target article a single 
implementation of predictive coding is presented as if this were the theory of predictive coding 
itself. Other implementations of predictive coding have been formulated which can explain 
additional neurobiological phenomena.
Predictive coding (PC) is typically implemented using a hierarchy of neural populations, alternating 
between populations of error-detecting neurons and populations of prediction neurons. In the 
standard implementation of PC (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Friston, 2005), each population of 
prediction neurons send excitatory connections forward to the subsequent population of error-
detecting neurons, and also send inhibitory connections backwards to the preceding population of 
error-detecting neurons. Similarly, each population of error-detecting neurons also sends 
information in both directions; via excitatory connection to the following population of prediction 
neurons, and via inhibitory connections to the preceding population of prediction neurons. See for 
example Fig.2 in Friston (2005), or Fig.2b in Spratling (2008a). It is therefore inaccurate for Clark 
to state (see sections 1.1 and 2.1) that in PC the feedforward flow of information solely conveys 
prediction error, while feedback only conveys predictions. Presumably what Clark really means to 
say is that the standard implementation of PC proposes that inter-regional feedforward connections 
carry error, while inter-regional feedback connections carry predictions (while information flow in 
the reverse directions takes place within each cortical area). However, this is simply one hypothesis 
about how PC should be implemented in cortical circuitry. It is also possible to group neural 
populations differently so that inter-regional feedforward connections carry predictions, not errors 
(Spratling, 2008a). 
As alternative implementations of the same computational theory, these two ways of grouping 
neural populations are compatible with the same psychophysical, brain imaging, and 
neurophysiological data that is reviewed in section 3.1.  However, they do suggest that different 
cortical circuitry may underlie these outward behaviours. This means that claims (repeated by Clark 
in section 2.1) that prediction neurons correspond to pyramidal cells in the deep layers of the cortex, 
while error-detecting neurons correspond to pyramidal cells in superficial cortical layers are not 
predictions of PC in general, but predictions of one specific implementation of PC. These claims, 
therefore, do not constitute falsifiable predictions of PC (if they did then the idea that PC operates in 
the retina – as discussed in section 1.3 – could be rejected, due to the lack of cortical pyramidal 
cells in retinal circuitry!). Indeed, it is highly doubtful that these claims even constitute falsifiable 
predictions of the standard implementation of PC. The standard implementation is defined at a level 
of abstraction above that of cortical biophysics: it contains many biologically implausible features, 
like neurons that can generate both positive and negative firing rates. The mapping between 
elements of the standard implementation of PC and elements of cortical circuitry may, therefore, be 
far less direct than is suggested by the claim about deep and superficial layer pyramidal cells. For 
example, the role of prediction neurons and/or error-detecting neurons in the model might be 
performed by more complex cortical circuitry made up of diverse populations of neurons none of 
which behave like the model neurons but whose combined action results in the same computation 
being performed. 
The fact that PC is typically implemented at a level of abstraction that is intermediate between that 
of low-level, biophysical, circuits and that of high-level, psychological, behaviours is a virtue. Such 
intermediate-level models can identify common computational principles that operate across 
different structures of the nervous system and across different species (Carandini, 2012; Phillips and 
Singer, 1997), they seek integrative explanations that are consistent between levels of description 
(Bechtel, 2006; Mareschal et al, 2007), and they provide functional explanations of the empirical 
data that are arguably the most relevant to neuroscience (Carandini et al., 2005; Olshausen and 
Field, 2005). For PC, the pursuit of consistency across levels may prove to be a particularly 
important contribution to the modelling of Bayesian inference. Bayes’  theorem states that the 
posterior is proportional to the product of the likelihood and the prior. However, it places no 
constraints on how these probabilities are calculated. Hence, any model that involves multiplying 
two numbers together, where those numbers can be plausibly claimed to represent the likelihood 
and prior, can be passed-off as a Bayesian model. This has led to numerous computational models 
which lay claim to probabilistic respectability while employing mechanisms to derive 
“probabilities”  that are as ad-hoc and unprincipled as the non-Bayesian models they claim 
superiority over. It can be hoped that PC will provide a framework with sufficient constraints to 
allow principled models of hierarchical Bayesian inference to be derived.
A final point about different implementations, is that they are not necessarily all equal. As well as 
implementing the PC theory using different ways of grouping neural populations we can also 
implement the theory using different mathematical operations. Compared to the standard 
implementation of PC, one alternative implementation (PC/BC) is mathematically simpler while 
explaining more of the neurophysiological data: compare the range of V1 response properties 
accounted for by PC/BC (Spratling, 2010; 2011; 2012a; 2012b) with that simulated by the standard 
implementation of PC (Rao and Ballard, 1999), or the range of attentional data accounted for by the 
PC/BC implementation (Spratling, 2008b) compared to the standard implementation (Feldman and 
Friston, 2010). Compared to the standard implementation, PC/BC is also more biologically 
plausible, for example, it does not employ negative firing rates. However, PC/BC is still defined at 
an intermediate-level of abstraction, and therefore like the standard implementation, provides 
integrative and functional explanations of empirical data (Spratling, 2011). It can also be interpreted 
as a form of hierarchical Bayesian inference (Lochmann and Deneve, 2011). However, it goes 
beyond the standard implementation of PC by identifying computational principles that are shared 
with algorithms used in machine learning, such as generative models, matrix factorization methods, 
and deep learning architectures (Spratling, 2012a), as well as linking to alternative theories of brain 
function, such as divisive normalisation and biased competition (Spratling, 2012a, Spratling, 
2008b). Other implementations of PC may in future prove to be even better models of brain 
function, which is even more reason not to confuse one particular implementation of a theory with 
the theory itself.
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